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Abstract. Conceptual engineering is the method for assessing and improving our concepts. Some
have recently claimed that the implementation of such method in the form of ameliorative projects
is truth-driven and should thus be epistemically constrained, ultimately at least (Simion 2018b; cf.
Podosky 2018). This paper challenges that claim on the assumption of a social constructionist analysis
of ideologies, and provides an alternative, pragmatic and cognitive framework for determining the
legitimacy of ameliorative conceptual projects overall. The upshot is that one should not ameliorate for
the sake of truth or knowledge, in the case of ideologies — at least, not primarily.
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[M]an rests upon the merciless, the greedy, the insatiable,
the murderous, in the indifference of his ignorance —
as if hanging in dreams upon the back of a tiger.
Friedrich Nietzsche (1873)
1 Introduction10
Conceptual engineering is the method for assessing and improving our concepts.1 Some have
recently reiterated the claim that the implementation of such method in the form of ameliorative
projects is truth-driven and should thus be constrained by epistemic considerations — be it
primarily (Simion 2018b) or only ultimately (Podosky 2018). Epistemic-alethic agendas have in
fact always been pretty influential among projects in conceptual engineering.2 Since Carnap15
(1947), Carnap (1950), and Carnap (1963) and until the most recent work by, e.g., Brigandt
and Rosario (2020), Haslanger (2020), Peréz Carballo (2020), Sawyer (forthcoming), and Scharp
(2020), to mention but a few. Yet, the novelty of Simion and Podosky is to have epistemic
standards underpinning all-around the legitimacy of projects in conceptual engineering, and
*Address: Arché Philosophical Research Centre, University of St Andrews, 17–19 College Street, St Andrews, Fife
KY16 9AL, Scotland. Email: isaac.manuelgustavo@gmail.com.
1This paper expressly assumes that conceptual engineering is about concepts, on pain of creating a misnomer
otherwise, which would obviously turn the concept of conceptual engineering into a very bad case of conceptual
engineering (cf. Cappelen 2018: 53, 104) — call this the “self-discrediting predicament.”
2Thanks to a reviewer (this journal) for prompting me on this.
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especially, in the social world, for the latter.3 This paper challenges that stance on the assumption20
of a social constructionist analysis of ideologies. Social constructionism is indeed paradigmatic
of ameliorative projects in conceptual engineering applied to ideological concepts at work in
our social reality (e.g., Haslanger 2012). And I argue that, on the premise of the validity of a
social constructionist analysis of ideologies — which I won’t defend here — cognitive efficacy
should replace truth and knowledge as normative standard for determining the legitimacy of25
ameliorative projects undertaken under the banner of conceptual engineering. Thereby, the
upshot is not so much that one should (sometimes) ameliorate for non-epistemic/non-alethic
aims too. Maybe most people agree on this. But rather, that one should not ameliorate for
epistemic/alethic aims, in the case of ideologies — at least, not primarily. Hence, the title.
The paper goes as follows: Section 2 and 3 introduce and refine, respectively, what certainly30
represents the most full-fledged epistemic limiting procedure for conceptual engineering that is
available in the literature to date. Section 4 shows that traditional truth-criterion and epistemic
standards are ill-suited, if not wholly irrelevant, when it comes to accounting for ameliorative
projects undertaken by conceptual engineering in the case of ideologies. Section 5 provides an
alternative, non primarily alethic or epistemic, but instead pragmatic and cognitive framework35
for determining the legitimacy of ameliorative conceptual projects in general. Section 6 briefly
responds to some possible objections, before Section 7 wraps up the whole argument to conclude.
2 Alethic Engineering
In a recent contribution to this journal, Simion (2018b: 915) starts by noting that most of
the work that deals with the limits of conceptual engineering has so far only focused on the40
metaphysical limits of the program — that is, addressing issues such as: Can we engineer, and
to what extent? — while its normative limits were then largely overlooked. The issue of the
normative limits for the program of conceptual engineering concerns, not the possibility (in
the sense of being feasible), but rather the need for ameliorative projects. In other words:
Whether we should, provided that we could, (re-)engineer our conceptual devices, and if so,45
according to what kind of criterion (e.g., truth, efficacy, moral goodness, etc.)? This worry
for the normative limits that may constrain the program of conceptual engineering becomes
particularly pressing when one takes the method of conceptual engineering not to aim at merely
fixing the deficiencies of our conceptual devices,4 but instead at improving any such devices, be
they deficient or not (Simion 2018b: 918–919). In that case, indeed, one then immediately faces50
a wrong-kind-of-reasons problem — where a reason is said to be “of the wrong king” when, in
spite of counting in favor of some action or attitude, it fails to bear on whether this action or
attitude is valuable and, more specifically, has the right kind of value (Gertken and Kiesewetter
2017). This is made obvious in the following example:
3See Dutilh Novaes (2020) and Dutilh Novaes (forthcoming), however, on the social and political dimension of
Carnap’s explication, in line with Neurath’s project of ‘social engineering,’ and more generally, with their shared
commitment to the values of Enlightenment (cf. Carus 2007).
4Such negative characterization of the purpose of conceptual engineering — a.k.a. ‘deficiency-engineering’
in Koch’s (2019) parlance — is commonly endorsed in the literature, both when it draws directly on Carnapian
explication and more generally too (e.g., Brun 2020; Cappelen 2017; Cappelen 2018; Cappelen 2020; Dutilh Novaes
2020; Dutilh Novaes and Reck 2017; Machery 2017; Scharp 2013; Scharp 2020; Scharp and Shapiro 2017).
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Say that, through some weird causal chain, engineering our concept [of deer] in use so as55
to exclude red deer would improve the life expectancy of bumblebees, which, given that
bumblebees pollinate crops, would, in turn, result in economic advantages. Should we
exclude the most common type of deer from the extension of ‘deer’ on these counts? Should
we take on the epistemic loss? Intuitively, this does not seem right. (Simion 2018b: 921)
So, “intuitively,” not just any improvement justifies the application of the method of conceptual60
engineering to some conceptual device. Something more should be required, which Simion
(2018b: 923) phrases in epistemic terms, with her so-called “Epistemic Limiting Procedure (ELP):
A [conceptual device] should be ameliorated iff (1) There is all-things-considered reason to
do so and (2) The amelioration does not translate into epistemic loss.”5 Importantly for our
purposes (cf. Sect. 4, 5), the ELP builds on the unquestioned assumption that concepts are65
representational devices whose core function, qua representational devices, is an epistemic
one — namely, to (accurately) represent the world (Simion 2018b: 923).
Yet, Simion’s (2018) ELP has been further sophisticated. Against the requirement for
knowledge preservation that underlies its correlated epistemic, representational, and ultimately
truth-driven (hence, alethic) version of conceptual engineering, Podosky (2018) has indeed70
recently objected, also in this journal, that there are cases in which epistemic losses actually are
beneficial toward the achievement of some further ends (e.g., political, social, moral). Such cases
are, on Podosky’s account, those of ideologies, in which some set of (presumably) detrimental
concepts lead to the enactment of oppressing social structures and should as such be ameliorated,
be it through their revision, elimination, or replacement (e.g., Haslanger 2012: chap. 15, 17;75
Haslanger 2020).6 Section 3 outlines Podosky’s (2018) case for Beneficial Epistemic Losses, and
the remainder of the paper draws the consequences for the limits one may want to impose to
the legitimacy of conceptual engineering as ameliorative project.
3 Beneficial Epistemic Losses
To put it short, on Podosky’s (2018) account, beneficial epistemic losses correspond to cases in80
which there is a practical need — be it moral, social, or political — for a temporary mismatch
between a concept and the reality it represents. In other words, what we want in such cases is
for a concept to provisionally be representationally inaccurate (e.g., by not carving reality at
any of its joints), and therefore epistemically unsatisfying, while its representational accuracy
(and epistemic satisfecit) is expected to be re-gained thanks to its alleged causal influence on85
the reality it (mis-)represents (Podosky 2018: 10). As already said, such cases are those of
ideologies construed à la Haslanger (op. cit.) by Podosky himself, that is, as sets of corrupted
representational devices (foremost among them, ideological concepts) that constitute oppressive
social structures and thereby set the frame for unjust social practices and relations. According
to Podosky’s take on Haslangerian analyses of ideologies, ideological concepts are thus de facto90
representationally accurate, for they actually construct, or contribute to constructing at least,
the social reality they represent. Podosky (2018: 8) states it quite clearly indeed: “[I]deology
5The ELP is formulated as operating on “representational devices” [loc. cit.] (instead of conceptual ones); for my
worries concerning this terminology, see footnote 1, as well as Sections 4 and 5.
6One can think of race talk in which, or so goes the currently fashionable view, the social race concept should
replace the biological one in order to fight discrimination and advance social justice (cf. Andreasen 2020).
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partly constitutes social reality. Thus, ideological concepts accurately represent social reality.”
And as such self-fulfilling sets of representational devices, ideological concepts are both truth-
conducive and epistemically satisfying, all at once, in the sense that they typically tend to yield95
true beliefs about their own content, which are themselves justified on the basis of how things
stand in the social reality they construct, at least in part, and represent. To put it in Podosky’s
(2018: 6) terms, ideologies make themselves true.
So, when one engages in an ameliorative project with the aim of changing social reality
through the replacement or revision of some corrupted, ideological concepts, what one is100
actually asking for is an epistemic loss: We want some representationally inaccurate (and
therefore truth-unconducive, so to speak) concept to replace/revise some representationally
accurate (and therefore truth-conducive) concept. And provided that the resulting social change
is taken to be good (e.g., as promoting social justice, etc.), such epistemic loss is expected
to be beneficial. Simion’s (2018) ELP clearly cannot account for such beneficial epistemic105
losses as legitimate ameliorative project for some given ideological (and however corrupted)
concept.7 Accordingly, and with a view to preserving the unquestioned epistemic responsiveness
of concepts, Podosky (2018: 9) proposes to amend the second clause of the ELP as follows:
“(2) There is not all-things-considered epistemic reason to refrain from amelioration.”
I do not challenge this amendment per se, but more radically its rationale, namely, that the110
legitimacy of ameliorative projects undertaken under the banner of conceptual engineering
should always ultimately be normatively constrained by some epistemic standards. This is
the case on Podosky’s (2018) revised ELP, since the correlated epistemic losses are assumed to
be only temporary: In virtue of the alleged causal power of ideological (and anti-ideological)
concepts over social reality (Podosky 2018: passim), social reality is indeed ultimately expected115
to conform to the concepts that serve to (re-)shape it.8 Section 4 argues that, pace Podosky
(2018), the ideology case does not merely establish the need to reframe the ELP in a way that
accommodates for beneficial temporary epistemic losses, but instead, and more radically, that
epistemic standards are ill-suited, if not wholly irrelevant, for determining all-around the
legitimacy of ameliorative conceptual engineering projects. Section 5 proposes an alternative,120
non-epistemic type of standards for determining the legitimacy of such ameliorative projects,
7Indeed, Simion (2018b: 924) makes herself perfectly clear on this: “Take, for instance, again, the project of
engineering the concept of ‘woman’. Again, say that there was nothing wrong with it from an epistemic point of
view: it is a perfectly coherent concept, and, in its current shape has zero detrimental epistemic effects. Say, however,
that it is morally, socially and politically defective, and it has substantive undesirable consequences for women’s
lives. Should we not attempt to engineer? This does not seem right. My answer to this question will lack much in the
way of nuance: ‘No, we shouldn’t!’. Insofar as our concept of woman is epistemically perfectly functional, we should
leave it be, for reasons pertaining to success in inquiry.” (See Simion [2018a] for the full-length argument, and note
that Podosky [2018] barely mentions this objection.)
8Actually, two cases of replacement/revision are to be considered in the fight against ideologies: Replace-
ment/Revision of ideological, reality-constructing concepts either by non-reality-constructing concepts or by reality-
constructing concepts (be they ideological, anti-ideological, or none of these). The first case results in epistemic losses
in the long run, which can only be recovered by making the replacing/revised concepts to accurately represent the
reality they are about — it corresponds to what (Podosky 2018: 9–10) calls “epistemic loss simpliciter.” By contrast,
the second case results in epistemic losses that are only provisional, and which will be recovered in virtue of the
alleged causal effect the replacing/revised concepts have on the social reality they will contribute to constructing — it
corresponds to what Podosky (ibid.) calls “temporary epistemic loss.” This latter case is the one that is dealt with by
the revised ELP. Yet, in both cases alike, epistemic standards appear ill-suited to determine all-around the legitimacy
of engineering projects, for they would either be resorted to at the detriment of anti-ideological/non-ideological,
non-constructive concepts or they would just become trivialized, as argued below. Thanks to a reviewer (this journal)
for prompting me on this.
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and then Section 6 defends it against some possible objections.
4 Power vs. Truth
According to social constructionist takes on ideologies like the one outlined above, ideologies are
self-fulfilling in the sense that the concepts which they are made of are somehow endowed with125
the performative power to shape, or at least to contribute to the shaping of, the social reality they
are about when they are enacted into social practices and relations. Take, for instance, a sexist
concept of woman that characterizes women as being better caretakers and a socio-economic
system in which that concept and its associated conceptions (e.g., that women are less committed
to their career or tend to forego economic success for the reward of motherhood, etc.) get enacted130
through an average gender wage gap of 15% to women’s detriment. Under these circumstances,
when a partner in a heterosexual couple has to make adjustment in their work for child-care
reasons (e.g., work part-time, take time off, etc.), it will typically be the woman. Men will thereby
accrue more human capital, wealth, and power in their social and family relationships. And
as a result, on a social constructionist account of phallocratic ideologies, the pattern of a “self-135
perpetuating economic structure that systematically disadvantages [women]” (Haslanger 2016:
123) will appear to be reinforced. The sexist concept of woman would thus have contributed to
the shaping of the social reality they are about, making thereby the phallocratic ideologies they
compose self-fulfilling.9
Against that background, it is then pretty obvious that ideologies fit rather poorly with a140
representationalist understanding of the relation between concepts and what concepts are about,
for such representationalist understanding seems to critically require both the independence
and the prevalence of what is represented (viz., reality) from/over what is representing it (viz.,
concepts) — whereas an ideological social reality results from and depends on its ideological
constitution by ideological concepts, at least in part.10 Now, provided that one is willing to grant145
that representation requires both the independence and prevalence of the represented from/over
the representing, ideological concepts cannot represent the social reality they constitute (precisely,
because they constitute it).11 And if ideological concepts cannot, and a fortiori do not, represent
social reality (in this regimented sense of “representation” [cf. note 11]), it would then make no
sense to speak of their representational accuracy and claim, as Podosky (2018: 6) does, that “the150
concepts of an ideology carves [sic] social reality at the joints.”
What is thus undercut by the rejection of the representationalist picture of concepts, on
which concepts basically purport to provide us with true beliefs about the world when they
enter, as unsaturated components, the formation of full thought contents, is the recourse to
anything like a correspondence view on truth in order to account for the performative power155
9This is an elaboration on Haslanger’s (2016) Invisible Foot case discussed in Podosky (2018: 5ff.).
10Podosky (2018: 10) speaks of “direction of influence,” from-concept-to-world versus the other way around.
11To be clear: What is targeted with this regimentation of the notion of “representation” is only its mimetic dimen-
sion, according to which what is represented (viz., reality) is approached through some reproductive mechanism
that yields a bearer which means to portray it (cf. Floridi 2011: 301). By contrast, the contentful dimension of the
notion of “representation” remains untouched. And therefore, stating that ideological concepts do not represent is
not tantamount to claiming that ideological concepts are contentless — as something can perfectly be contentful and
non-representational at once (in this regimented sense of “representation”).
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of ideological concepts.12 So that, when we aim at changing some ideological concepts, these
are not, and shouldn’t be taken as being, truthful, in the sense of being accurately representing
an independent social reality; rather, they’re powerful, and should be taken as such, that is, as
having succeeded to shape reality so that it fulfils them; and what we want, or rather, what we
should aim at, is to overthrow their power, not to debate over their representational accuracy.13160
For instance, when gay right activists challenged the ideological concept HOMOSEXUAL with
the slogan ‘Born this way,’ they were not speaking truth against the categorization of same-sex
attraction as an unnatural and deviant form of sexuality. Rather, they were exhibiting gay pride
as a means to claim for the social, economic, legal, etc. entitlements which same-sex couples
were, and still are, deprived from (see Cantalamessa [2019], with reference to Barnes [2016] and165
Barnes [2017]).14 Ideology so conceived is thus not a matter of truth, but of power — that is, the
power of shaping reality. And on those grounds, traditional epistemic standards, based on some
alethic criterion (such as that of, e.g., truth as correspondence), appear to be utterly ill-suited, if
not merely irrelevant in order to make sense of ideological concepts.15 Yet, for the purposes of
conceptual engineering, this is not so problematic.170
The reason why the inexpediency of traditional epistemic standards for conceptual engi-
neering is not problematic is that very few of the concepts that we use in our everyday life
and which may turn to be of concern to conceptual engineering will happen to be, pace Simion
(2018b: 923) and Podosky (2018: 2, 3, 8), primarily or ultimately driven by alethic purposes,
and thus primarily or ultimately responsive to epistemic standards.16 The remanent portion of175
truth-driven, epistemically responsive concepts will presumably be those at work in the sciences,
and maybe as well in philosophy, depending on what one takes the relationship between science
and philosophy to be. For example, if together with Scharp’s (2020) metrological naturalism,
one takes that relationship to be continuous, in that the purpose of philosophy would be that
of fixing its constitutively deficient concepts (namely, by means of the method of conceptual180
engineering), prior to outsourcing the philosophical questions they raise to science, then one
would certainly be inclined to take philosophy itself to also be truth-driven and epistemi-
cally responsive, in the sense of being based on some representational accuracy criterion. But
12NB. the notion of “truth” and its derivatives occur 9 times in Podosky (2018) (including once in a section title
and twice in quoted form). Since it never comes with any sort of clarification on how to construe it, I suspect it being
used rather informally, and in a not that much theory-laden way, as is typically captured by a correspondence view
on truth, which takes truth to hold in the correspondence of a bearer (e.g., beliefs, mental representations, etc.) to
some external item (e.g., objects, facts, state of affairs, etc.) that makes the bearer true.
13Note that Burgess and Plunkett (2013: 1094) precisely come to reject the option of relabelling their enterprise
‘ethics of representation’ on the ground that “the R-word seems to carry strong inflationary connotations” with
respect to truth and reference, whereas what conceptual engineering is about may well not “intrinsically or essentially
[be] representational in an inflationary sense.”
14One can think of such ‘linguistic interventions’ in terms of ‘communicative transformative disruptions’ that
aim at worldly transformations through the transgression of the normal functioning of a given language system, as
“[w]hen babies started sporting onesies with I love my mommies! printed on them” (Sterken 2020).
15Note that Podosky (2018: 2) concedes the point, prior to rejecting it on no further ground than the alleged
epistemic responsiveness of concepts: “Thus, one might conclude that the right kind of reason for conceptual
engineering is not (always) epistemic. However, following Simion, I accept that the proper functioning of a concept
is that it is responsive to epistemic reasons.”
16By way of illustration, can one really think that the lay concept of tomato which groups tomatoes among
vegetables is truth-driven in any respect of representational accuracy? Of course not! And yet, it is cognitively so
much more efficient than the scientific (truth-driven, representationally accurate) one when the task at stake is that
of cooking a salad. (For other compelling examples about lay vs. scientific concepts of whale or berry, see Chalmers
[2011: 519] and Brun [2016: 1219], respectively.)
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that’s only one option, rather idiosyncratic by the way. Now the question is: What alternative
standards and criteria may suitably serve to determine the legitimacy of ameliorative projects185
undertaken by conceptual engineering (including ideological cases)? Section 5 develops such
non-epistemic/non-alethic alternative, before we turn to some possible objections and replies in
Section 6.
5 Non-Alethic Engineering
Let us take stock here. According to my analysis (Sect. 2–4) and contra Podosky (2018), what the190
case of ideologies ‘constructionistically’ construed shows is: That concepts of the ideological
kind happen to be self-fulfilling; that, in virtue of such self-fulfilment, they debunk the basic
representationalist picture to make sense of their meaning-relation to social reality; that this
debunking in turn undermines the relevance of traditional (viz., correspondentist [cf. note 12])
truth criterion for ideological concepts; and thereby, that traditional epistemic standards appear195
to be ill-suited, if not merely irrelevant, when it comes to normatively determining the legitimacy
of ameliorative projects undertaken by conceptual engineering in cases of ideologies. Here, in
the case of ideologies, truth is not the right criterion, neither epistemicity the good framework
to assess the cognitive quality of concepts — or to put it the other way around, in the case of
ideologies, “thought can fail us without being false” (Haslanger 2012: 411). And again, this200
is perfectly fine, for very little of our concept-involving cognitive activities aim at enabling
us to (joint-carving) know things; rather, (joint-carving) knowledge is only one among many
other possible cognitive purposes for concepts to have (Nado 2019: Sect. 5). Building, as the
ELP does, on the unquestioned assumption that the core function of concepts is an epistemic
one — namely, to (accurately) represent the world (Simion 2018b: 923) — is thus nothing but205
philosophical wishful thinking. As Shields puts it in a recent manuscript:
[P]hilosophers have been too quick to project their own philosophical selves into these
contexts. We assume that the speakers are genuinely interested in getting at the correct or
best understanding of a particular concept because, as philosophers, this is the approach we
would take to the exchange.17210
The presumably widespread disconnection between truth-driven epistemic standards and
successful concept-involving cognitive behaviour or activity in our everyday life (remember,
“thought can fail us without being false” [loc. cit.]) calls for a non-alethic framework for
determining the legitimacy of conceptual engineering. And a straightforward candidate is to
be searched for in the very success conditions of our concept-involving cognitive behaviour215
and activity, and cashed out in pragmatic terms. With this in mind, after many others and
against Cappelen (2018: Chap. 16),18 I propose to adopt a functionalist take on concepts for the
purposes of conceptual engineering, on which concepts are taken to be some sort of devices that
serve one or several purposes — serving their purposes being the concepts’ function. Yet, as no
17And Shields to further flesh this idea out by contrasting philosophers’ inquiry on the concept of personhood
with that of “a corporate lobbyist whose motivation is to ensure that the prevailing institutional (and perhaps
non-institutional) understanding of personhood is one that is most materially advantageous for the corporate sector.”
18See, e.g., Eklund (2014: Sect. 2), Eklund (2015: 376), Nado (2019), Prinzing (2018: 5), Thomasson (2020), and
Simion and Kelp (2020), etc. — so much so that one can even claim with Nado (2019) that functionalism is somehow,
implicitly or not, the default position among conceptual engineers.
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one before except Machery (2017: Chap. 7), I propose to further substantiate this functionalist220
take in psychological terms. Let me just unpack this a bit.
Developing a full-fledged psychological understanding of the concept of concept for concep-
tual engineering falls beyond the scope of this paper (see ??? for more details). However, suffices
to say for the present purposes that psychological theories of concepts commonly characterize
them as bodies of information about some referent(s) that are retrieved by default from long-225
term memory in order to play a role in the cognitive processes underlying the higher cognitive
competences (e.g., abstraction, categorization, induction, etc.) that are exercised to execute some
higher cognitive task (e.g., language understanding, reasoning, planning, etc.) about that or
these referent(s) (Machery 2009: Chap. 1). Against that background, a concept’s function is the
role it plays in the cognitive processes underlying the higher cognitive competences of an agent.230
And a functionalist take then consists in considering the primary quality measure of concepts
to be a matter of efficacy, that is, of how well they fulfil their function of ultimately enabling the
agent to execute the cognitive task they are used for.19 Following Nado (2019), and in contrast
with anything like a ‘central’ or ‘proper’ conceptual function common to alternative versions of
functionalism (cf. Haslanger 2012: 225; Thomasson 2020), the function of each concept is here235
taken to be both multiply instantiable, since it co-varies with the cognitive processes in which
they are at work (e.g., categorization-process, etc.), and wide-ranging, since these cognitive
processes underlie a broad spectrum of competences which are themselves exercised to execute
a large number of higher cognitive tasks. Basically, on this account, it is the cognitive task at
stake in a given cognitive context that comes to specify the concept’s function — namely, the240
role it is meant to play in the activation of one of our higher cognitive competences.
Take, for instance, the above deer case (Sect. 2). If, in the context at stake, the concept-
involving cognitive activity aims at preserving bumblebees or obtaining economic advantages,
it will then make perfect sense, according to the present functionalist (viz., function-based,
efficacy-driven) framework, to re-engineer the current (scientific) concept of deer to meet these245
purposes. Yet, this is not so to say that the current (scientific) concept of deer, which may well be
perfectly suited for biological taxonomic purposes (among others), must be replaced all-around
by its environmental or economical variant.20 But rather, that some of its alternative variants are
locally better suited to serve other purposes (e.g., that of policy-making), however unadapted
to classify animal species. What we will thus come to gain by replacing knowledge and truth250
by function and efficacy is an high flexibility in terms of calibration and context-dependence
for the success condition of our concept-involving cognitive behaviours and activities — which
admittedly means a much harder (and yet so much more relevant) work when implementing
the method of conceptual engineering on specific case studies.
Now, such context-dependent functionalist variant of conceptual engineering may seem to255
face a critical situation in that it would allow for a good, that is, a cognitively efficient, concept
serving a whatever bad function (e.g., morally, socially, politically, epistemically, etc.) to override
a bad, that is, cognitively inefficient, concept serving a whatever good function (e.g., morally,
19“An example here might be the ‘four food groups’ that many Americans of a certain age learned in primary
school; that rough-and-ready method of classifying foods vastly oversimplifies the diversity of their nutritional
properties, but has the benefit of being easy to learn and deploy.” (Nado 2019: 15)
20Simion (2018b: 925-926) has three objections against context-dependent versions of functionalist conceptual
engineering, which all ultimately boil down to some petitio principi, in that all presuppose the primacy of truth-driven
epistemic responsiveness of concepts, as “[a]fter all, there is, plausibly, no such thing as inquiry-free domain.”
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socially, politically, epistemically, etc.), and this precisely, in virtue of these concepts’ cognitive
efficacy — that is, in virtue of them being more or less conducive to execution of the cognitive260
task they are used for. Typically, in this framework, a highly oppressive ideological concept
of race or gender might score better than its poorly liberating challenger within a given social
reality. Two alternative solutions, however, are here easy at hand: Either to bite the bullet and
claim that conceptual engineering, as methodological framework, is and should be axiologically
neutral with respect to conceptual functions (and ultimately handing the decision over to265
the case study commissioning people — notwithstanding whatever wrong-kind-of-reason);21
or to make our functionalism for engineering projects slightly more radical and claim that
re-engineering conceptual functions (i.e. assessing and improving them) also falls within the
remit of conceptual engineering (Nado 2019; Thomasson 2020). Both options are perfectly
sensible. But what we would have dropped anyways is the primary recourse to some truth-270
driven epistemic standards.22 For, as soon as conceptual efficacy gets to become the chief aim
of conceptual engineering in a functionalist fashion, “truth and knowledge, by contrast, [will
always only be] secondary goals at best.” Here, in short: “The challenge is to generate concepts
that are effective, not analyses that are true,” and “[s]uccess is measured in terms of efficacy”
(Nado 2019: 4, 19, 17).275
6 Objections and Replies
In what follows, I briefly consider and respond to two possible objections to my proposal of a
pragmatic and cognitive framework for determining all-around the legitimacy of conceptual
engineering. Firstly, to my argument against the relevance of any alethic/epistemic framework
for accounting for ideologies, which ultimately hangs on an analysis of the concept of represen-280
tation (Sect. 4), one could object that representations do not necessarily imply the ontological
independence and prevalence of what is represented from/over what is representing. Here, my
very basic rebuttal would be that, if the concept of representation were not to involve such onto-
logical dichotomy and hierarchy between the represented and the representing, then it should be
replaced — on pain of being misleading otherwise, if only etymologically (which may obviously285
be taken as a conceptual defect). And I would further contend that, even if representation were
not to involve the dichotomy and hierarchy under consideration, this would not mean that
the correspondence view on truth, which is itself certainly at work in standard constructionist
analyses of ideologies (cf. note 12), does not itself depend on such dichotomy and hierarchy
(which has been shown to be ill-suited to account for ideologies [Sect. 2, 3]). Secondly, one could290
argue that there might be a non truth-driven epistemic framework that encompasses suitable
standards for the ameliorative projects undertaken by conceptual engineering. That’s perfectly
fine. Yet, I would argue that, since the primacy of truth would thus have been overthrown in
this framework, it would again be misleading to continue speaking of knowledge. And I would
21Cf. Dutilh Novaes (forthcoming) on the normative neutrality of Carnapian explication: “From a methodological
perspective it can be viewed as an advantage, attesting to the wide applicability of [the method].”
22Arguably, the latter case (namely, that of the radical functionalist) is less obvious in that it may seem that
advocating between different competing conceptual functions, possibly “by appealing to further functions” (Nado
2019: 16), would ultimately hang on some truth-driven epistemic standards; but this would either bring us straight
back to the ideology case as counter-argument (Sect. 4) or build on some kind of ‘axiologic absolutism’ which, as a
proper case of ideology, would also bring us back to Section 4, again, as counter-argument.
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therefore urge replacing epistemic talk by talk in terms of cognition (Sect. 5).295
7 Conclusion
This paper was about the normative constraints that may limit the legitimacy of the ameliorative
projects undertaken under the banner of conceptual engineering. My main claim was that,
if a Halsangerian-like constructionist analysis of ideologies is to be correct, then truth and
knowledge are not by themselves well suited with a view to setting up an all-around framework300
for normatively determining the legitimacy of ameliorative projects in conceptual engineering.
With this in mind, I came to propose at last a pragmatic and cognitive alternative for developing
such framework. One could obviously challenge social constructionism and its account of
ideologies. In fact, neither were meant to be defended by this paper. But the validity of social
constructionism bypasses the question of the normative limits of conceptual engineering. This305
is indeed all another story. To be left for another occasion.
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